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Consider the following familiar and seemingly cogent anti-Fregean argument.1 
Take a pair of strict synonyms in English, such as (presumably) 'ketchup' and 'catsup'. As 
these terms have the same meaning in all respects, it seems indubitable that they have the 
same propositional value - or semantic content - with respect to every possible context of 
use. Now consider a speaker, Sasha, whose mother tongue is not English and who learns 
the meanings of 'ketchup' and 'catsup' by means of ostensive definitions in the following 
way, not being told at the outset that they are straightforward synonyms. Sasha acquires 
the words by reading the labels on the bottles in which ketchup (or catsup) is served during 
meals. It happens that the same condiment is regularly served to him in bottles labelled 
'catsup' at breakfast, when it is eaten with eggs and hash browns, and in bottles labelled 
'ketchup' at lunch, when it is eaten with hamburgers. And such a situation induces Sasha to 
think that he is consuming a different condiment in each case (though one which is similar 
in taste, colour and consistency). Therefore, whereas 'Ketchup is ketchup' is uninformative 
to Sasha, 'Ketchup is catsup' would be quite informative to him: his knowledge would be 
substantially extended if he came to know that the condiment is one and the same in both 
cases. Hence, by  the sort of strategy labelled by Nathan Salmon “the generalized Frege's 
Puzzle”,2 one would come to the conclusion that the information value of 'ketchup' 
                                                          
1 See Salmon  1990, 220-3. 
2 See Salmon 1986, 73. 
(whatever it is) differs from the information value of 'catsup' (whatever it is), which clearly 
contradicts the obvious principle that synonymy preserves information value. 
 In this paper I discuss three possible rejoinders to the above sort of anti-Fregean 
argument. I retain the third one as the most promising. 
To begin with, an indirect counter-argument could be adduced to the effect that the 
argument in turn contradicts the following equally obvious principle:3  
 (E) Necessarily, if a speaker x understands two expressions E and E' in a language 
L, and E and E' are (strict) synonyms in L, then x knows that E and E' are 
synonyms in L.  
Principle (E) seems to be quite plausible: having grasped the meanings of E and E', and 
given that E and E' have the same meaning, one is bound to be aware of this fact. And 
such a principle is of course violated in the anti-Fregean argument. On the one hand, Sasha 
is credited with an understanding of the words 'ketchup' and 'catsup' (he is supposed to 
have learnt the meanings of the words). On the other, the words in question are taken to be 
strict synonyms in English. Yet, Sasha does not know that they are synonyms. Therefore, 
one should apparently conclude that either principle (E) is false or the Millian argument is 
wrong.  
 Nonetheless, it should be noted that principle (E) is not unchallengeable. Consider 
the following parallel principle: 
 (E*) Necessarily, if a speaker x understands two expressions E and E' in a 
language L, and E and E' are not (strict) synonyms in L, then x knows that they 
are not synonyms in L. 
Now (E*) turns out to be false. For instance, competent speakers of English will claim that 
words such as 'stop' and 'finish', or 'accident' and 'mistake', are synonymous, until they are 
                                                          
3 This principle is subscribed to by Michael Dummett; see e.g. Dummett 1981, 323-4. 
presented with examples which make clear the non-synonymy of the words as those 
speakers themselves use them. And such a sort of result about (E*) might be exploited to 
cast some doubt upon (E). Thus, concerning a synonymous pair E and E', it might be 
claimed that a speaker who understands both E and E' might be inclined to count them as 
synonymous, but withhold belief in synonymy because her experience of counter-
examples to (E*) makes her suspect that she is wrong.  
 Of course, this could hardly be taken as evidence that principle (E) is false. And if 
the above sort of dilemma were inescapable one would be naturally inclined to take the 
latter horn of it; indeed, principle (E) is intuitively compelling and should not be given up 
on that basis. However, as we shall see, there is just no need to argue from the truth of 
principle (E) to the unsoundness of the anti-Fregean argument, and hence our dilemma 
turns out to be clearly escapable. I would regard the foregoing reflection about principle 
(E*) as at least showing that the indirect counter-argument from principle (E) is not as 
persuasive as one might think, in the sense that the intuitive strength of (E) may be after all 
insufficient to yield a convincing refutation of the Millian argument.  
 A second sort of reply to the anti-Fregean argument, which in a way complements 
the one just outlined, consists in what we might call the objection from partial (or 
imperfect) understanding. It might be argued that the 'ketchup'/'catsup' story does not 
satisfy a requirement which turns out to be crucial to Frege’s original argument about 
informativeness. The requirement in question is that the speaker fully understand both 
sentences S and S' and therefore the singular terms out of which these sentences are 
composed (where S' results from S by replacing at least one occurrence of a singular term t 
in S with a co-referential singular term t’). And it is alleged that it is doubtful whether the 
anti-Fregean argument meets this kind of demand since, on the one hand, Sasha is not a 
native or fully competent speaker of English, and, on the other, his peculiar way of 
learning the use of the words 'ketchup' and 'catsup' might be regarded as revealing that he 
has only a partial (or imperfect) grasp of the meanings of these words; and a full mastery is 
indeed required in the Fregean argument.  
 Now I have doubts about the effectiveness of such a line of attack. Indeed, it seems 
to be vulnerable to the following sort of intuitively powerful objection. Suppose that Sasha 
had learned the meaning of 'ketchup' in the peculiar way described before, but without the 
word 'catsup' coming into the story. This would normally be quite adequate for 
understanding. On the other hand, also learning something about 'catsup' should not 
undermine that. Hence, one may say that Sasha understands 'ketchup'; and, by a parallel 
argument, one would say that he also understands 'catsup'. Of course, there is no reason to 
think that such an objection would be decisive; maybe some reasonable reply could be 
framed against it. And one might even be inclined to think that the issue whether or not a 
speaker like Sasha should be credited with an adequate understanding of the words 
'ketchup' and 'catsup', is a moot issue; or that it is unlikely that anything like an appeal to 
our ordinary intuitions about understanding would enable us to settle the dispute. Anyway, 
I guess that we are at least entitled to conclude that, given its relative weakness and lack of 
intuitive support, the objection from partial understanding is far from representing a good 
move against the Millian argument. 
 Finally, let me sketch a third sort of argumentative strategy one might pursue in 
dealing with the 'ketchup'/'catsup' story and similar cases from a Fregean perspective. Let 
us begin by taking for granted the premiss about understanding employed in the Millian 
argument. And let us recall that the argument is intended as a reductio, the allegedly 
absurd conclusion of which is the following claim: 
(*) 'ketchup' and 'catsup' have different propositional values (with respect to 
Sasha's story);  
 Incidentally, some Millian theorists (especially Salmon) would take the reductio 
hypothesis to be the claim that 'Ketchup is catsup' is genuinely informative to Sasha. And 
the crucial premisses in the argument are these: 
 (@) If expressions E and E' are synonymous (in a language L) then E and E' have 
the same propositional value (with respect to every possible context of use). 
 ($) 'Ketchup' and 'catsup' are synonymous (in English). 
(*)  is deemed implausible because, given ($), it comes out as inconsistent with (@), and 
(@) and ($) are both supposed to be obviously true. Now a Fregean reply could proceed in 
either of the following two directions.  
 On the one hand, one could just reject premiss ($), while keeping (@) and 
endorsing (*). As a result, (*) could no longer be taken as a reductio of anything at all. But 
how could ($) be reasonably challenged? Well, one might begin by maintaining that the 
notion of synonymy has no clear application to the case of proper names; indeed, ordinary 
proper names have no linguistic meanings, in the sense that definitional clauses like those 
one may find in a dictionary are not, in general, available for them. Then one might claim 
that words like 'ketchup' and 'catsup' may be thought of as having a semantic status which 
is very similar to that of proper names: they are names of substances or names of kinds of 
stuff. One could then apparently conclude that, strictly speaking, words of that sort have no 
linguistic meanings either; hence, the notion of synonymy has no straightforward 
application to them. However, I do not think that such an approach is convincing.  
 First, and less important, it turns out that some authorized English dictionaries4 
actually count the words 'ketchup' and 'catsup' as being strict synonyms, the latter being - 
                                                          
4 E.g. Collins English Dictionary and The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary. 
along with 'catchup' - just a spelling variant of the former (a variant used mainly in the 
U.S.A.).  
 Second, and more important, even if one happens to be reluctant to apply the 
notion of synonymy to names of artificial kinds, it turns out that an argument can be 
mounted which parallels the 'ketchup'/'catsup' argument and yet involves only colour 
words; and the objection from the inapplicability of the notion of synonymy would hardly 
make sense with respect to colour words. Thus, in Portuguese there are two different 
words for red, viz. 'vermelho' and 'encarnado', which have literally the same meaning (at 
least as these words are presently used); I am pretty sure that every native (or fully 
competent) speaker of Portuguese would promptly acknowledge such words as being 
strictly synonymous.  
 Now suppose that Ronald, a monolingual speaker of English, is taught Portuguese 
by the direct method and learns 'vermelho' and 'encarnado' under the following sort of 
circumstances. First, he learns the meaning of 'vermelho' by being presented with samples 
of a particular shade of red. Then he comes to learn 'encarnado' by being presented with 
samples of what is in fact the very same shade of red. It just happens that, on the later 
occasion, Ronald does not remember the particular shade of red he saw when he learned 
'vermelho'; so, when he acquires the word 'encarnado', he does not even entertain the 
question whether 'vermelho' holds of the samples then seen.  
 Let us agree that one is entitled by ordinary standards to credit Ronald with an 
adequate understanding of the Portuguese predicates 'vermelho' and 'encarnado'. Then it 
would be possible to draw from the above case conclusions which parallel those drawn 
from the 'ketchup'/'catsup' story, a significant difference between the two arguments being 
that in the 'vermelho'/'encarnado' argument the premiss about synonymy seems to be 
incontrovertible. In particular, it would not be difficult to imagine a set of circumstances 
under which the Portuguese sentence 'Vermelho é (is) encarnado' (as uttered on the later 
occasion) would carry non-trivial or informative information to Ronald (whereas 
'Vermelho é (is) vermelho' would be clearly uninformative to him).  
 The objection might be raised that as soon as Ronald considered the matter, he 
would realize that the words in question are synonymous. Yet, a possible reply might be 
given as follows: Ronald may realize that 'vermelho' and 'encarnado' have similar 
meanings, but feel unable to rule out the possibility that he will one day see a shade that 
will strike him as vermelho, but not as encarnado. 
 Alternatively, and this is the kind of move I would be inclined to favour, one could 
just reject premiss (@), while accepting premiss ($) and fully endorsing claim (*). Again, 
it would follow that (*) could no longer be taken as a reductio of anything at all. But how 
could one reasonably reject (@)? Well, it turns out that from a Fregean standpoint, a 
standpoint in which information values are (at least partially) senses or modes of 
presentation, claim (@) is by no means compulsory. Indeed, it seems to me that a Fregean 
theorist might, plausibly and fruitfully, hold the view that sameness of linguistic meaning 
does not entail sameness of sense.  
 Notice that the connection holding between the notions of linguistic meaning and 
Fregean sense is a very loose one, at least according to the general conception of sense 
with which some Fregean theorists are willing to work. The linguistic meaning 
conventionally correlated with a given singular term, e.g. an indexical expression, is 
certainly an objective feature of the term; it is something which remains necessarily 
constant across speakers and across occasions of use. By contrast, the Fregean senses 
associated with singular terms are, in many cases, non-conventional and subjective; it is 
always possible for singular modes of presentation to vary from speaker to speaker and/or 
from occasions of use to occasion of use.  
 Thus, different speakers may be in a position to attach distinct particular senses to a 
given singular term token t (at a given time), or to tokens t and t' of the same type (at the 
same or at different times), even when t and t' are co-referential with respect to given 
contexts of use; i.e., they may entertain different particular ways of thinking of the object 
referred to. And the same speaker may be in a position to attach distinct particular senses 
to singular term tokens t and t' of the same type (at different times), even when t and t' are 
co-referential in given contexts of use; i.e., she may entertain on distinct occasions 
different particular ways of thinking of the object referred to. However, in all such cases, it 
seems obvious that the linguistic meaning of the singular term tokens - which is conferred 
upon them by the types of which they are tokens - is necessarily the same. On the other 
hand, for any tokens t and t' of different types which are co-referential with respect to 
contexts c and c', it is obviously not the case that if t and t' express the same particular 
sense in c and c' relative to a given speaker, then t and t' are synonymous (or belong to 
synonymous types); according to some neo-Fregean accounts, certain uses of indexicals 
such as 'here' and 'there', or demonstratives such as 'this' and 'that', illustrate this point. 
 Moreover, one may even introduce cases in which singular term tokens t and t' 
which are co-referential (in given contexts of use) and which belong to different but 
synonymous types are nevertheless to be seen, at least in the light of certain brands of 
Fregeanism, as having different senses with respect to a given subject. Thus, one may 
safely assume that the expression-types 'yesterday' and 'the day (just) before today' have 
exactly the same linguistic meaning (dictionaries usually give the latter as the meaning of 
the former). But consider tokens of such types as uttered by a speaker, say Jones, under the 
following sort of circumstances. At 11:58 pm on a day d Jones asserts 'Yesterday was 
mild', having thus a belief about d-1; and one hour later, looking at his watch, he comes to 
assert 'The day before today was not mild', apparently having thus a belief about d. Yet, 
Jones happens to be unaware that Summer Time ends precisely at midnight on d and that 
then clocks go back one hour, so that the time of his later assertion is in fact 11:58 pm on d 
and the associated (putative) belief a belief about d-1. Now if one thinks of the modes of 
presentation correlated with temporal indexicals as consisting in, or as being determined 
by, ways of tracking a time - or re-identifying it - throughout a period of time, then it will 
not be the case that Jones entertains on both occasions (or, rather, at what is conventionally 
the same time) the same singular sense.5
 The preceding considerations motivate a picture of the relationship between 
linguistic meaning and information value on which there is a considerable gap between the 
two notions and on which claim (@) is not, in general, true. Claim (@) is simply taken for 
granted in the anti-Fregean  argument; and this is so because, considered in its application 
to ordinary proper names and to names of (natural or artificial) kinds, it comes out as 
trivially true under a strict Millian account. In effect, the object or the kind referred to by 
any syntactically simple singular term of the above sort (in a given context) is regarded on 
such a view as playing a double semantic role: it is (or at least it determines) the linguistic 
meaning of the term; and it is also the propositional value assigned to the term (in the 
context). But it seems to be somehow unfair to invoke this doctrine - as a means of 
validating claim (@) - in the course of assessing an argument whose aim is to show that 
such a doctrine is wrong. And once one drops the Millian conception of the information 
values of simple sentences as being singular propositions, which are by definition 
psychologically insensitive, in favour of a conception of such information values as being 
Fregean thoughts, which are by definition psychologically sensitive, claim (@) ceases to 
be compelling. 
                                                          
5 This is a very rough description of the case under consideration. I examine the notion of indexical sense in my Oxford D. Phil. 
Thesis Direct Reference, Cognitive Significance and Fregean Sense.  
 I am therefore prepared to endorse the claim that, in general, it is possible for 
expressions which are strict synonymous (in a given language) to have different senses in a 
speaker's idiolect. Concerning the 'ketchup'/'catsup' story, I would say that Sasha employs 
different ways of thinking of the same condiment, the 'ketchup'-way of thinking and the 
'catsup'-way of thinking. He is obviously not aware that he is being presented with a single 
kind of stuff at breakfast and at lunch; no wonder then that the thought that ketchup is 
catsup is informative to him. Given their analogy with ordinary proper names, names of 
natural or artificial kinds are - to use Evans's terminology6 - information-invoking singular 
terms. Accordingly, one could sketchily represent Sasha's distinct modes of presentation of 
ketchup as consisting in different chains of information, or in separate mental files titled 
'ketchup' and 'catsup', formed on the basis of his disparate cognitive encounters with the 
condiment at breakfast and at lunch. And a parallel treatment might be provided to the 
'vermelho'/'encarnado' case, the difference being that even a Millian theorist would 
acknowledge that colour predicates are to be assigned something very akin to Fregean 
senses as their propositional values in possible contexts of use. Indeed, on Salmon's theory 
of predicative reference, in contradistinction to the case of syntactically simple singular 
terms, syntactically simple predicates are thought of as having two sorts of semantic value: 
their information values, which are taken to be certain intensional entities like n-ary 
attributes; and their references, which are taken to be certain extensional entities like 
functions from n-tuples of objects to truth-values. But Salmon would presumably treat 
synonymous predicates like 'vermelho' and 'encarnado' as invariably contributing one and 
the same unary attribute to the information contents of sentences in which they might 
occur. And this would not enable us to accommodate possible differences in cognitive 
significance which, pace Salmon, we wish to take as basic data in need of explanation, 
                                                          
6 See Evans 1982, 384-5.
such as the potential difference in informative value - relative to Ronald and to his story - 
between a thought expressed with the help of 'vermelho' and a thought expressed with the 
help of 'encarnado'. Thus, I would say that Ronald employs in thought different ways of 
thinking of redness; or, if one prefers, he employs different ways of thinking of that 
function or Fregean concept which yields, for any red surface as argument, the True as 
value. And Ronald's case seems to motivate a De Re view of the kind of senses expressed 
by colour terms, i.e. a view on which such senses are to be seen as being (partially) 
dependent upon certain perceptual relations holding between a thinker and colour samples 
in her environment; in effect, it is the presence of this sort of non-conceptual factors which 
ultimately explains why redness is presented to Ronald under distinct modes of presenta-
tion. 
 A consequence of the above way of countering the anti-Fregean argument is that 
principle (E) should be, after all, given up. We are committed to the result that e.g., though 
'vermelho' and 'encarnado' are synonyms (in Portuguese), Ronald does not know that they 
are synonyms. If Ronald knew this then he would know that 'vermelho' and 'encarnado' are 
co-extensional predicates and thus that one and the same colour is presented to him on 
both occasions; but then a sentence such as 'Vermelho é encarnado' would not express a 
thought which would be informative to him. Therefore, since we take as intuitively sound 
the claim about informativeness, and since we take the objection from imperfect 
understanding as intuitively dubious, we are forced to reject principle (E). Now I think that 
there is nothing essentially wrong in pursuing this train of thought. Underlying principle 
(E) is a certain form of cartesianism about meaning, in the sense that our knowledge about 
sameness of meaning is taken to be infallible. But one may have good reasons, in this and 
in other areas of philosophical inquiry, to be suspicious about such cartesian principles; it 
is very likely that linguistic meaning is not as transparent as it is claimed, and that even 
fully competent and reflective speakers may be mistaken about synonymy. 
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